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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXXV FALL, 1949 NUMBER 1
THE LANDWARD EXTENSION OF ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION: THE 1948 STATUTE
ARNOLD W. KNAUTH*
The line between water and dry land is clear and sharp. Not only
can it be seen at the edge of every sea, lake and river; it can be felt by
a swimmer on the darkest night. One might suppose that the line be-
tween the law of the sea and the law of the land would be equally
simple and obvious. Yet in our English and American tradition, few
lines are fuzzier and more bedevilled by argumentative distinctions.
In Professor Robinson's phrase, "the line wobbles."
The urge to argue arises from the twin facts that ships with their
owners, their assets, and the whole company of witnesses to an event
frequently raise anchor and float away from the place and jurisdiction
where the event occurred, never to return--quite unlike a building on
land with its group of occupants and apparatus of ownership and
tenancy and employment; and that the legal remedies developed by
our maritime courts are quite different from those of our terrene courts.
These differences are largely due to the necessities of a practice adapted
to the rapid movement of ships, ship cargoes and maritime witnesses.
Thus the maritime jurisdiction permits arrest in rem and a form
of "foreign attachment" without bond or other security given by the
plaintiff to protect the defendant against an abuse of process, in frank
reliance on the proctor's good faith.' It permits the prompt taking
of testimony by deposition de bene esse-for whatever it is worth-on
very short notice and without delaying formalities or provision for
expenses of the opposing party.2 It grants the maritime lien which is
secret and adheres to the ship as she passes from port to port, and from
owner to owner.3 It operates through the single judge, without a jury."
In the United States the maritime jurisdiction is limited to the federal
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1 BENEDICT ox Anm tALTr Ch. XXIV, §§ 288-94, (6th ed. 1940).
2 BENEDlCT, Ch. XXXIX, §§ 389-96.
3 RoBINsoN, ADumAix'snX 363 (1939); Grifn, The Federal Maritime Lien Act of 1910
and 1920, 1923, 37 HARV. L. Rav., 15 (1924), 1924 A. M. C. 206; Fitz-Henry Smith, The
Maritime Lien Act, 1910, 24 HARv. L. REV. 182 (1911).
4 English admiralty judges are assisted by two Trinity House masters or navigational
experts; in other countries nautical assessors assist the courts.
1
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courts, which results in a high degree of uniformity in practice and
substantive law throughout the nation. In all countries seamen's
wage cases are given preference in hearing, and seamen may sue as a
matter of right without giving any security for costs,5 In the United
States, there may be an appeal from an interlocutory decree fixing
the liability,6 without waiting to complete the proofs of damages. And
an appeal is often trial de novo on the record, with a possibility of
adducing new testimony and obtaining new findings,7 resulting in a
final decision instead of the tedious remand for a new trial by the lower
court. Admiralty hears cases involving less than $3,000. Admiralty
can divide the damages 50-50 in the event of mutual fault.' Admiralty
imputes fault to a ship in rem even when the shipowner has no personal
fault, as when damage is caused by a compulsory pilot. Admiralty
sustains contracts which exempt tug-boat owners from liability for
the acts of their employees who direct the movements of large vessels
in harbors, under certain circumstances; 10 it often implies a warranty
that vessels will be seaworthy."1 These and other rules and distinctions
may have a decisive effect on the outcome of any given situation.
The citizenry who are interested in the question whether these
procedural and substantive legal differences between the maritime
law and the common, code or "civil" law will apply to their disputes are
not merely the shipowners and their customers-the cargo shippers
and the passengers-but also their employees, the brokers, the terminal
operators, the public officials who enforce regulations by fines and
penalties and forfeitures, and, nowadays, also the government as a
commercial shipowner and operator, shipper of cargo, employer of
maritime labor, and as operator of Navy and Coast Guard vessels
which commit torts. Behind many of these interested groups stand
5 Seamen enjoy this privilege regardless of pay and resources; others who wish to sue
at public expense must take pauper's oaths. Longshoremen are not seamen for this pur-
pose. Raccuglia v. U. S., 66 F. Supp. 769, 1946 A. M. C. 1063, (E. D. N. Y. 1946).
6 62 STAT. 929 (1948), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1292, 2107 (Supp. 1949), as amended 63 STAT.
-, P. L. 72, c. 139, §§ 107-08 (1949).
7 Grovell v. Stockard S. S. Co., 176 F. 2d 121, 1949 A.M.C. 1621 (3d Cir. 1949).
8 RoBIRsoN, ADnmRALTY 90, 683, 853; Sprague, Divided Damages, 6 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rtv.
15 (1928); Huger, Proportional Damages at Sea, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 531 (1928).
9 Griffin, The American Law of Collision, 440-48, 552 (1949) ; ROBINSox, ADmIRALTY 364,
703, 704; The Gateway City-Salawati (N. V. Stoomvaart Maatschappi, Etc. v. Waterman),
82 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. N. Y. 1949) and 83 F. Supp. 705, 1949 A. M. C. 895 (S. D. N. Y. 1949).
10 The William J. Worth (Publicker v. Tugboat Neptune Co.), 171 F. 2d 48, 1949 A. M.
C. 121 (3d Cir. 1949).
11 See KNAuTA , Ocam Bsirs Or LADING 159 (3d ed. 1947). Apart from bills of lading,
see The Fred E. Hasler, 55 F. 2d 919, 1932 A. M. C. 237, (2d Cir. 1932).
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the insurance companies which underwrite marine risks. This is a
considerable segment of the seagoing and commercial community; and
there can be much energy put into argument of fine points of fact and
law.
The story for us may be said to begin about the year 1350, when the
Court of the Admiral took form in England, and perhaps more definitely
in 1375, when rules of the court were drawn up at the Inquisition of
Quinsborough and approved by King Edward III.12 The co-existence of
two sets of the king's courts and judges was bound to produce conflict in
due time; it was the Admirals who first sought to extend their jurisdic-
tion,'3 but legal historians have emphasized the later struggle when Coke
ruled the common law courts and jealously fought to restrict the scope of
the admiralty jurisdiction in the seventeenth century."4 In this he largely
succeeded. Eventually, in the earlier days of Victoria's reign, the rising
commercial interests in London brought about a truce satisfactory to the
businessmen and underwriters of the City, which was expressed in the law
reform statutes known as the Admiralty Court Acts of 1840, 1846, 1854,
1861, 1868, culminating in the general reorganization of the English
courts in 1873.1' That solution has remained in satisfactory operation in
all the parts of the British Empire to the present day, and seems to be
surviving the transformations which have caused various parts of that
Empire to become independent political and legal units. But the tradition
and philosophical apparatus of argument about the limits of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, having been instilled in men's minds and
become highly developed, have continued to furnish unending ammuni-
tion for counsel, courts and legislators.
The British solution of 1873 did not, of course, apply as statute in
the United States, and a century of independence from British rule had
built up such a strong body of separatist law that there was apparently
never any serious thought of adopting the British formula in America.
We had bickered on the subject hotly prior to the British reform-
notably in 1825 over the extension of federal maritime law to the rivers
bordering and traversing Kentucky,16 which was given up in the face
of fierce opposition by the Kentuckians, and again in 1845-1852-1866,
when the federal maritime jurisdiction was successfully asserted over
12 BENEDICT §§ 682-83.
13 BENEDICT § 688.
14 BE.EDICT § 690.
15 BE.EDICT § 703.
16 2 WA REN, THE SuPREM CoURT IN U. S. HIsTOR C. 16 (1924); BENEDICT § 734;
The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428 (U. S. 1825) (opinion of Mr. Justice Story).
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the five Great Lakes, 17 and soon afterwards--despite Kentucky-to all
the interior rivers and lakes comprising the inter-connected water trans-
portation system of the continent.18 We continued to handle these mat-
ters through the courts, which by interstitial legislative decisions under
the guise of constitutional interpretation have occasionally extended
and occasionally pruned the limits of the jurisdiction down to recent
times.'9 "The wobbling of the lines drawn under the present rules,"-
in Professor Robinson's words-was well described, in all its curious
and sometimes amusing exfoliations, in his volume on Admiralty
published in 1939.20
One of the most annoying rules of the American law has been that
the admiralty jurisdiction might not deal with damage done by a ship
to an object on the land. Thus, if a swing-bridge carelessly hit a ship,
admiralty could entertain the ship's suit against the bridge-owner;
but if a ship carelessly hit a bridge, admiralty could not hear the
bridge-owner's case, which had to proceed in the common law courts.
Again, if a derrick on a pier damaged a ship, admiralty could proceed,
but if a derrick on a ship damaged a pier, it could not. If a ship hired
tug-boats and pilots to move the ship from one pier to another, and
these carelessly caused the ship to ram a wharf or shed, the wharf and.
17 An act of Feb. 26, 1845, declared the extension of jurisdiction, but was challenged. In
1850, Mr. Erastus C. Benedict, in the first edition of his LAW or AmEICAN AtuRALTY,
eloquently argued that the Great Lakes are great waters, comparable in their character
and commerce with the seas and oceans, and properly within admiralty jurisdiction. See
the sixth edition, § 43. In 1851, the Supreme Court endorsed his argument, saying that
the Act of 1845 was constitutional, and abandoned the Thomas Jefferson ruling. The
Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443 (U. S. 1851). This time there was
no such political outcry as had been heard in 1825.
18 The Court considered the Act of 1845 superfluous; jurisdiction of inland waters ex-
isted anyway without a statute. The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555 (U. S. 1866).
19 Jurisdiction extended: The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361 (1904); The Raithmoor, 241
U. S. 166 (1915); Yarabeck's Case, 50 F. Supp. 488, 1943 A. M. C. 1283; (W. D. Mich.
1943), Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. U. S., 308 U. S. 378, 194 A. M. C. 1 (1940).
This last is celebrated by the jingle:
Where, oh where is New River in Virginia?
It made the jurisdiction of the admiralteel
Nice little river near the tops of the mountains,
Never saw a steamer and it wouldn't float a tugboat,
Roosevelt wanted power for some Tennessee farmers,
So it made the jurisdiction of the admiraltee!
Jurisdiction reduced: The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213 (U. S. 1867); Cleveland Term.
& V. R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. S. 316 (1908), wherein "The court," says Rob-
inson, "specifically repudiated justice Brown's views expressed in the Blackheath, that
there was [is] admiralty jurisdiction for injury by a vessel [to a bridge and dock] ...
The Steel Ranger, 62 F. Supp. 605, 1945 A. M. C. 1123, S. D. N. Y. 1945.
20 RoBiNson, ADMImALTY 50-69 (1939).
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shed damage could not be litigated in the admiralty court." These
closely-trimmed rules became very troublesome when the government
in 1942 suddenly became a large shipowner and operator, because the
existing congressional permission to sue the government on its shipping
contracts and torts happened to be limited to the admiralty jurisdiction;
hence there was no current permission to sue the government for a ship
damage to a shore property. These niceties of jurisdiction became quite
disproportionate to the results sought or attainable. "New sets of
facts," as Professor Robinson observed, "keep the land structure con-
troversy on the go."22
At the date of Robinson's book, proposals for reform had drifted
ineffectually for some thirty years. "The obscurities would be cleared
up," he wrote, "if admiralty jurisdiction were stated in terms of injury
merely by a slip."13 That was the view of Judge Veeder. But Robin-
son was hopeless of reform:
The point has now ceased to be arguable. The shore structure
may not sue the vessel in admiralty; the vessel may sue the shore
structure in admiralty.24 Even where the bridge and the ship are
both at fault, the bridge still must sue at common law. The tra-
ditional common law effect of contributory negligence invites the
ship to stay out of the state courts and get into the forum in which
its negligence will cost it least .... The cross-libel [by the bridge]
has no better standing than would the same cause of action if
brought on an original libel.
Yet the result of the Norfolk-Berkeley Bridge case25 was that "if the
ship initiates limitation of liability proceedings, it consents to an equita-
ble handling of the damages, in favor of the shore structure, and on
the basis of the admiralty rule for division .... The whip is in the ship-
owner's hand in either case."26
There can be an argument about the constitutional power of Congress
to enlarge the admiralty jurisdiction landwards by legislative act. A
similar doubt had beset the Preferred Ship Mortgage Act of 1920,27
but an opinion of Chief Justice Hughes25 effectually laid that doubt.
Relying on that precedent, Robinson expressed the view that a legisla-
21 Id. at 50, text and notes.
22 Id. at 60.
23 Id. at 61.
24 Id. at 66:
25 U. S. Norfolk v. Berkeley Bridge Corp., 29 F. 2d 115, 1928 A. M. C. 1636 (E. D.
Va. 1928).
26 ROBINSoN, ADi A.LTY 68, 69.
27 41 STAT. 1000 (1929), 46 U. S. C. § 911 et seq. (1946), as amended 49 STAT. 2016
(1936).
28 The Thomas Barlum, 293 U. S. 21, 1934 A. M. C. 1417 (1934).
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tive extension in favor of shore structures would be constitutional, in
these words which are currently believed to justify the new Act:
The constitutionality of an act extending maritime jurisdiction
to injury to shore structures by ships would seem to be covered,
argumentatively at least, by the reasoning used to sustain the
Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 46 U. S. Code § 911 et seq. The Thomas
Barlum. .. 293 U. S. 21, 55 S. Ct. 31, 79 L. Ed. 176 [1934 A. M. C.
1417]. The latter case explained away Bogart v. The John Jay,
(1854) 58 U. S. (17 How.) 399, 15 L. Ed. 95, in which the
Supreme Court had denied the very jurisdiction which the new
act conferred....
In HOUGH [Admiralty Jurisdiction-Of Late Years, 37 HAuv.
L. REv. 529 (1924)], the late Judge Hough, who both at the bar
and on the bench was an admiralty lawyer of the first rank, re-
marked: "Truly, as Holmes, J., remarked when he started trouble
in The Blackheath, the scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not a
matter of 'obvious principle or very accurate history' and it is
just as true now as when Brown, J. wrote in his essay that 'the
certainty of the law would have been better conserved either by
following the Plymouth case in The Blackheath, or overruling it in
the subsequent cases.'" Hough also remarks that the cases re-
pudiating Brown's view "all disposed of without mention of The
Blackheath, were a wet blanket to the lower courts."29-
The passage of the statute extending admiralty, jurisdiction to damage
by ships taking effect on land was largely due to a curious twist in
the sudden increase of the federal government's interest in shipping.
The government had, in far-away 1939, practically withdrawn from
the shipping business, in which it had been engaged to a steadily lessen-
ing degree since the first World War ended in 1918; such vessels as
it still allocated to commercial services were leased to operators who
were privately responsible for tortsY° Hence the government cared not
at all about the form of remedy for land damages; and private inter-
ests did not care much either because the common law remedy was
available and, while cumbersome, could be made to work in most cases.
This indifference vanished suddenly. The second World War put the
government back into the ship-owning and -operating business on a
greater scale than ever. Accidents of all sorts began producing ad-
miralty libels in a torrent,31 under the Suits in Admiralty Act of 192032
29 ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 61 n.19.
30 Brady v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575, 1943 A. M. C. 1 (1943).
31 Approximately 10,000 libels were received by the Attorney General in the space of
three-and-a-half years. The majority were for seamen's injuries.
32 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U. S. C. §§ 741-752 (1946).
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for merchant ships, under the Public Vessels Act of 192533 for public
vessels, and under both acts when the draftsman was uncertain about
the facts. Numerous damages by government ships to wharves, bridges
and other shore properties began to happen; but the damaged parties
could not file any suits because the two statutes permitting tort suits
against the government were strictly limited to admiralty cases. No
official could waive or extend the line defined by Congress. Often the
shore damage was part of a sequence of events largely maritime, as
when groups of tug-boats were shifting ships in harbors from one berth
to another, the navigation being disturbed by the acts of other pass-
ing vessels; it became a technical nuisance to have to segregate the
shore damage suits against private parties allegedly negligent, in a
state court suit at common law. The government's lawyers and pay-
masters felt bound to insist upon the absence of any right to sue the
government for damages done by publicly-owned vessels on land; and
the courts upheld these arguments." The idea that the sovereign can
do no wrong, and is immune from complaint, enjoyed another fling.
Congress in the midst of war was much too occupied to attend to pri-
vate bills for civil damages.
The pressure of claims resulting from the four years of war induced
Congress, in August, 1946, to concede not only the ship-shore point,
but many others as well, in the Federal Tort Claims Act.' It thus
became possible to sue in the ordinary federal courts for a great variety
of injuries inflicted by federal servants-airplane crashes, post office
truck accidents, army vehicle torts-all lumped together with damage
done by government ships to land structures. The remedy was by a
"civil" (common law) action in the federal district courts under the
Rules of Civil Procedure. Suddenly the government became much in-
terested in the matter of forum. It was administratively sounder to
place all ship cases in the admiralty court. The method lay ready at
hand-the long-mooted extension of admiralty jurisdiction. Pushed
by the Maritime Commission and the Navy, the dusty reform bill was
quickly enacted in June, 1948.6
33 43 STAT. 112 (1925), 46 U. S. C. §§ 781-790 (1946).
34 State of Maine v. U. S., 134 F. 2d 574, 1943 A. M. C. 495, (1st Cir. 1943). The gov-
ernment refused to recognize a claim by the state as owner of a bridge for damage caused
by a government vessel. The reversal of attitude brought about by the Federal Tort
Claims Act is exemplified by the Cooper River Bridge Case (United States v. South Caro-
lina Highway Dept.), 171 F. 2d 893, 1949 A. M. C. 350, (4th Cir. 1948), and the Pensacola
Bridge Cases (Florida State Highway Dept. v. U. S.), 1949 A. M. C. 1638.
3 60 STAT. 842 (1946), 28 U. S. C. § 2671 (1948).
36 62 STAT. 496 (1948), 46 U. S. C. § 740 (Supp. 1949), 1948 A. M. C. 1502.
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It remains to glance at some of the problems raised by the new
statute. The constitutional question has already been mentioned, and
the Act would seem to be valid. Procedurally, the Act has two aspects.
The first sentence is general; it applies to all litigants:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person
or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstand-
ing that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.
In any such case suit may be brought in rem or in personam ac-
cording to the principles of law and the rules of practice obtaining
in cases where the injury or damage has been done and consum-
mated on navigable water."T
This is in effect the text proposed many years ago by the Maritime
Law Association, and repeatedly suggested by its committeesf8 The
principal disputes are likely to be as to what is a "vessel" and what is
"on navigable water." These are ancient questions for the puzzlement
of the maritime brethren. One need only suggest that a launched
hull, afloat but incomplete, is not necessarily a vessel; that a vessel
laid up and somewhat dismantled may not be a vessel; and that a dry-
dock is, in legal contemplation, full of water.39 Lawyers will find the
usual areas for skirmishes along familiar lines.
These general provisions are not disturbing. They conform to Rob-
inson's view and Veeder's advice; they are equivalent to the long-
settled English rule. They restore the rulings of Justice Henry Billings
Brown in 1903, which his successors repudiated in 1907. We may
readily agree that they do not impose new burdens on owners of shore
structures nor force them into a new or objectionable court; the new
law merely confers on them a new remedy without depriving anyone of
the common law right as a complete alternative. Ship-owners will scarcely
complain if ship torts are heard by admiralty courts. They may regret
that persons injured on shore may now libel ships in rem and arrest them
until bond is furnished, or "foreign attach" a sister ship or other asset
without posting a plaintiff's attachment bond. But these are procedural
37 Ibid.
38 Maritime Law Ass'n Minutes 1775 (1930). The New York and American Bar Asso-
ciations were also active.
39 RoBimsoN, ADmIRALTY 42, 163; BENEDICT §§ 51, 69; The Meteor (Murray v. Schwartz),
1949 A. M. C. 1081 (2d Cir. 1949); The San Marcos, 140 F. 2d 230, 1944 A. M. C. 87
(4th Cir. 1944); Taylor v. Lawson, 64 F. 2d 521, 1933 A. M. C. 1200 (4th Cir. 1933).
As to dry docks, see 1942 AwNuAL Suav. AMR. LAW 584; Travellers Ins. Co. v. Branham,
136 F. 2d 873, 1943 A. M. C. 1419 (4th Cir. 1943); Travellers Ins. Co. v. McManiga,
139 F. 2d 949, 1944 A. M. C. 377 (4th Cir. 1944).
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troubles with which shipowners have long been familiar and with which
they are organized to cope.
The remainder of the Act applies only to government shipping, and
its daily importance will vary as the amount of government ship oper-
ation rises and recedes. At the moment, it is rapidly lessening. But
these aspects are nevertheless worth some discussion. The Act pro-
vides:
As to any suit against the United States for damage or injury
done or consummated on land by a vessel on navigable waters,
the Public Vessels Act or Suits in Admiralty Act, as appropriate,
shall constitute the exclusive remedy for all causes of action aris-
ing after the date of the passage of this Act and for all causes of
action where suit has not been hitherto filed under the Federal Tort
Claims Act:
Provided further, that no suit shall be filed against the United
States until there shall have expired a period of six months after
the claim has been presented in writing to the Federal agency own-
ing or operating the vessel causing the injury or damage. [Italics
supplied. ] 4
These provisions eliminate the option of a common law suit or an
admiralty suit. Private suitors have this option; the government de-
clines to give it. Charming puzzles can still be foreseen. Is a half-
completed government hull a "vessel"? 4 s If it drifts against my wharf,
do I sue under the Torts Act for a terrene tort, or in admiralty for a
tort by a vessel? The cautious draftsman will doubtless sue both ways.
But in admiralty damages may be divided, while at law a small element
of contributory negligence will wholly defeat recovery.
It will also be noted that the new Act is of no assistance in circum-
venting a plea of sovereign immunity by a foreign state as shipowner
or operator; and that it does not touch the question of suing the United
States in the courts of a foreign country. These remain for future solu-
tion; and it may be interjected that there is much feeling in Europe that
the mechanism set up by both the United States and England for deal-
ing with ship-damage cases in foreign ports is not wholly satisfactory.41
Under the new Act, you cannot sue the government at the place
"where the act or omission complained of occurred"-which the Torts
40 62 STAT. 496 (1948), 48 U. S. C. § 740 (Supp. 1949).
40a Texts and cases cited note 39 supra.
41 In 1949, the Comit6 International Maritime, in its call for the summer meeting, re-
marked that the British and the United States statutes' consent that the sovereign be sued
for its maritime torts in its own courts at home do not satisfy the general commercial need
of a right to sue a sovereign who engages in commerce in the same places where other
merchants and carriers can be sued.
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Act permits; the courts which may hear these admiralty cases are the
United States courts "where the parties so suing reside or have their
principal place of business in the United States, or in which the vessel
charged with liability is found." '42 So, a Delaware corporation owning a
wharf in Seattle will have to sue in Delaware or in, say, Alabama where
the offending vessel may be laid up. It would seem likely that there
would be pressure to amend the Act to permit suit at the place where
the wharf or bridge is located, which is where the witnesses will be.
Can the damage claimant take depositions at once, de bene? Or must
he wait six months? It would seem unjust to deny the familiar admiralty
right to take testimony of seagoing witnesses at once. 3
Courts have already been asked to decide whether the new law is
retroactive, and they have said it is not.44 None has yet given it retro-
active effect. As the initial date recedes into the remoter past, the ques-
tion will become unimportant.
But as it merely provides another remedy in addition to that already
existing for events which have occurred, the Act would seem to be pro-
cedural rather than substantive, and might be given retroactive effect.
The six-months delay for "administrative action" would seem to be a
nuisance, and, perhaps, a trap for the unwary. The time for suit being
two years from the date of the injury, the tricky result is that a party
who fails to give the six-months notice until eighteen months have
elapsed is unable to sue. This same six-months notice device was utilized
in the War Shipping Administration Clarification Act of March 24,
1943,11 and caused much difficulty. The record of voluntary settlements
42 Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 742 (1946). Almost identi-
cal wording appears in the Public Vessels Act, 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U. S. C. § 782
(1946).
43 Under the W. S. A. Clarification Act, 57 STAT. 45 (1943), 50 U. S. C. § 1291 (1946),
which imposes a delay in the filing of seamen's injury suits against the government until
there has been administrative inaction or disallowance, the actual practice has been to
agree to depositions de bene esse during the period preceding the filing of the libel.
44 The Jones Act, 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1946) giving seamen an
alternative common law remedy, was construed as a change in the substantive law, and
was not applied to accidents occurring prior to its enactment on June 5, 1920. An
interesting instance of the method of conducting seamen's injury cases before the Jones
Act became effective is Cricket S. S. Co. v. Parry, 263 Fed. 523 (2d Cir. 1920), in which
two powerful legal minds-former federal Judge Veeder and future federal judge
Woolsey-met before judges Ward, Hough and Manton. The Princess Sophia (Petition
of Canadian Pacific Co.), 278 Fed. 180, 197 (W. D. Wash. 1922); the Circuit Court of
Appeals did not mention the point upon appeal.
45 The provisions of the new Title 28 have, on the other hand, been applied to pending
suits; Bagner v. Blidberg, 84 F. Supp. 973, 1949 A. M. C. 1627, (E. D. Pa. 1949), is a
maritime example.
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during these six-months periods for administrative action would not
seem to justify an extension of the method; a party should be allowed
to get his suit started at any time, and not compelled to proceed in
two moves. A suit is also a notice; but a notice is not a suit. Odd
special rules of this sort do not comport with the dignity of the gov-
ernment in agreeing to handle its claims by the legal method in court.
They are ingloriously trailing clouds of the outworn doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity.
In 1939, Professor Robinson seemed well justified in doubting that
this reform would ever come about. His reputation as a prophet is
hardly diminished by the fact that it took a great war convulsion to
produce, on the side, this rather diminutive but thoroughly satisfactory
reform in the limits of the admiralty jurisdiction. Now that the exten-
sion statute is on the books, it may be expected to remain there into
the very long future.
